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STATE OF NEW YORK - BOARD OF PAROLE 
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL DECISION NOTICE 
Name: Hickey, Phillip Facility: Collins CF 
NY SID: 
DIN: 95-A-4294 
Appeal 
Control No.: 11-019-18 B 
Appearances: Stephen K. Underwood, Esq. 
1395 Union Road 
West Seneca, New York 14224 
Decision appealed: Octobe.r 2018 decision, denying discretionary release and imposing a hold of 21 
months. 
Board Member(s) Crangle, Berliner, Shapiro 
who participated: 
Papers considered: Appellant's Brief received March 8, 2019 
Appeals Unit Review: Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and Recommendation 
Records relied upon: Pre-Sentence Investigation Report, Parole Board Report, Interview Transcript, Parole 
Board Release Decision Notice (Form 9026), COMP AS instrument, Offender Case 
Plan. 
e undersigned detennine that the decision appealed is hereby: 
~;fi~med _Vacated, remanded for de novo interview _Modified to ___ _ 
~rmed Vacated remanded for de novo interview _. _Modified to----
_L_ Affirmed ~· ~Vacated: "manded for de novo ;nterv;ew _ Modified to ___ _ 
If the Final Determination is at variance with Findings and Recommendation of Appeals Unit, written 
reasons for the Parole Board's determination must be annexed hereto. 
This Final Detennination, the related Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and the sep te findings of 
the Parole Board, if any, were m~Jed to the Inmate and the.Inmate's Counsel, if any, on _Y"""', _,.li'-"+,t:--;'-_...."-"'--
Distribution: Appeals Unit-Appellant - Appellant's Counsel - Inst. Parole File - Central File 
P-2002(B) (11/2018) 
STATE OF NEW YORK – BOARD OF PAROLE 
APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION
Name: Hickey, Phillip DIN: 95-A-4294
Facility: Collins CF AC No.: 11-019-18 B
Findings: (Page 1 of 3)
Appellant challenges the October 2018 determination of the Board, denying release and 
imposing a 21-month hold. 
Appellant is serving an aggregate indeterminate term of imprisonment of 25 years to Life 
after having been convicted by guilty plea of Murder 2nd and Arson 3rd.  Appellant stabbed his 
victim to death and then returned later to set fire to the victim’s body with the resulting fire 
engulfing and damaging a building.    
The issues raised by Appellant are as follows: (1) the Board’s decision was arbitrary and 
capricious and not made in accordance with applicable legal authority; (2) the Board did not 
provide sufficient weight to certain scores contained in Appellant’s COMPAS instrument, while 
assigning too much weight to the serious nature of the instant offenses and Appellant’s disciplinary 
record; (3) the Department failed to develop a Transitional Accountability Plan (TAP); (4) the 
Board’s decision was insufficiently detailed; (5) the Board’s decision was made in violation of 
Appellant’s due process rights; and (6) the Board failed to provide a record of its deliberations. 
As to the first and second issues, discretionary release to parole is not to be granted “merely 
as a reward for good conduct or efficient performance of duties while confined but after considering 
if there is a reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released, he will live and remain at liberty 
without violating the law, and that his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will 
not so deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for the law.”  Executive Law § 
259-i(2)(c)(A) (emphasis added); accord Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 
A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d Dept. 2014).  “Although these standards are no longer 
repeated in the [Board’s] regulation, this in no way modifies the statutory mandate requiring their 
application.”  Notice of Adoption, NY Reg, Sept. 27, 2017 at 2.  A conclusion that an inmate fails 
to satisfy any one of the considerations set forth in Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) is an 
independent basis to deny parole.  See, e.g., Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 477, 718 
N.Y.S.2d 704, 708 (2000); Matter of Robles v. Fischer, 117 A.D.3d 1558, 1559, 985 N.Y.S.2d 386 
(4th Dept. 2014); Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268; Matter 
of Phillips v. Dennison, 41 A.D.3d 17, 21, 834 N.Y.S.2d 121, 124 (1st Dept. 2007).    
Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) requires the Board to consider criteria which is relevant to 
the specific inmate, including, but not limited to, the inmate’s institutional record and criminal 
behavior.  People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 
881 (1st Dept. 1983).  While consideration of these factors is mandatory, “the ultimate decision to 
parole a prisoner is discretionary.”  Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 477.  Thus, it is well 
settled that the weight to be accorded the requisite factors is solely within the Board’s discretion.  See, 
e.g., Matter of Delacruz v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1413, 997 N.Y.S.2d 872 (4th Dept. 2014); Matter 
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of Hamilton, 119 A.D.3d at 1271; Matter of Garcia v. New York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 
235, 239, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415, 418 (1st Dept. 1997).  The Board need not explicitly refer to each 
factor in its decision, nor give them equal weight.  Matter of Betancourt v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 
1497, 49 N.Y.S.3d 315 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of LeGeros v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 139 
A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834 (2d Dept. 2016); Matter of Phillips v. Dennison, 41 A.D.3d 17.  In 
the absence of a convincing demonstration that the Board did not consider the statutory factors, it 
must be presumed that the Board fulfilled its duty.  Matter of Fuchino v. Herbert, 255 A.D.2d 914, 
914, 680 N.Y.S.2d 389, 390 (4th Dept. 1998); Matter of McLain v. New York State Div. of Parole, 
204 A.D.2d 456, 611 N.Y.S.2d 629 (2d Dept. 1994); Matter of McKee v. New York State Bd. of 
Parole, 157 A.D.2d 944, 945, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204, 205 (3d Dept. 1990); People ex rel. Herbert, 97 
A.D.2d 128. 
In 2011, the law was amended to require procedures incorporating risk and needs principles 
to “assist” the Board in making parole release decisions.  Executive Law § 259–c(4); 9 N.Y.C.R.R. 
§8002.2(a).  The Board satisfies this requirement in part by using the COMPAS instrument.  Matter 
of Montane v. Evans, 116 A.D.3d 197, 202, 981 N.Y.S.2d 866, 870 (3d Dept. 2014); see also 
Matter of Hawthorne v. Stanford, 135 A.D.3d 1036, 1042, 22 N.Y.S.3d 640, 645 (3d Dept. 2016); 
Matter of LeGeros v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834 (2d Dept. 
2016); Matter of Robles v. Fischer, 117 A.D.3d 1558, 1559, 985 N.Y.S.2d 386, 387 (4th Dept. 
2014).  Notably, the 2011 amendments did not eliminate the requirement that the Board conduct a 
case-by-case review of each inmate by considering the statutory factors including the instant 
offense.  The amendments also did not change the three substantive standards that the Board is 
required to apply when deciding whether to grant parole. See Executive Law 
§ 259-i(2)(c)(A).  Thus, the COMPAS instrument cannot mandate a particular result.  Matter of 
King v. Stanford, 137 A.D.3d 1396, 26 N.Y.S.3d 815 (3d Dept. 2016).  Rather, the COMPAS is an 
additional consideration that the Board must weigh along with the statutory factors for the purposes 
of deciding whether the three standards are satisfied. See Matter of Rivera v. N.Y. State Div. of 
Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1107, 1108, 990 N.Y.S.2d 295 (3d Dept. 2014); accord Matter of Dawes v. 
Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1059, 994 N.Y.S.2d 747 (3d Dept. 2014); see also Matter of Gonzalvo v. 
Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017).  Furthermore, declining to afford 
the COMPAS controlling weight does not violate the 2011 amendments.  Matter of King v. 
Stanford, 137 A.D.3d 1396, 26 N.Y.S.3d 815 (3d Dept. 2016).   
As to the third issue, Correction Law 71-a requires DOCCS to prepare a Transitional 
Accountably Plan (TAP).  The name of the Transitional Accountability Plan was changed to 
“Offender Case Plan”, which is prepared for inmates in the Department’s custody based on their 
programming and treatment needs.  In making parole release decisions, the Board must consider 
the most current case plan that may have been prepared by DOCCS. 9 N.Y.C.R.R. §8002.2(b).  An 
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Offender Case Plan was prepared for Appellant and made available to the Board at the time of the 
interview. See also Matter of Alymer v. New York State Bd. of Parole, Index No. 218-16, Decision 
& Order dated Dec. 13, 2016 (Sup. Ct. Albany Co.) (McGrath J.S.C.) (inmate’s case plan met 
requirement of TAP in accordance with Correction Law 71-a). 
As to the fourth issue, the Board’s decision satisfied the criteria set out in Executive Law 
§259-i(2)(a) and 9 N.Y.C.R.R. §8002.3(d), as it was sufficiently detailed to inform the inmate of the 
reasons for the denial of parole.  Matter of Applegate v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 164 A.D.3d 
996, 997, 82 N.Y.S.3d 240 (3d Dept. 2018); Matter of Kozlowski v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 
108 A.D.3d 435, 968 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1st Dept. 2013); Matter of Little v. Travis, 15 A.D.3d 698, 788 
N.Y.S.2d 628 (3d Dept. 2005); Matter of Davis v. Travis, 292 A.D.2d 742, 739 N.Y.S.2d 300 (3d 
Dept. 2002); People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 
881 (1st Dept. 1983). 
As to the fifth issue, an inmate has no Constitutional right to be released on parole before 
expiration of a valid sentence as a person's liberty interest is extinguished upon conviction. 
Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 99 S. Ct. 2100, 
2104 (1979); Matter of Russo v. Bd. of Parole, 50 N.Y.2d 69, 427 N.Y.S.2d 982 (1980); Matter of 
Vineski v. Travis, 244 A.D.2d 737, 664 N.Y.S.2d 391 (3d Dept. 1997).  The New York State 
parole scheme “holds out no more than a possibility of parole” and thus does not create a protected 
liberty interest implicating the due process clause.  Matter of Russo, 50 N.Y.2d at 75-76, 427 
N.Y.S.2d at 985; see also Barna v. Travis, 239 F.3d 169, 171 (2d Cir. 2001); Matter of Freeman 
v. New York State Div. of Parole, 21 A.D.3d 1174, 800 N.Y.S.2d 797 (3d Dept. 2005). 
As to the sixth issue, the Board is not required to record its internal deliberations or 
discussions.  Matter of Barnes v. New York State Div. of Parole, 53 A.D.3d 1012, 862 N.Y.S.2d 
639 (3d Dept. 2008); Matter of Borcsok v. New York State Div. of Parole, 34 A.D.3d 961, 823 
N.Y.S.2d 310 (3d Dept. 2006); Matter of Collins v. Hammock, 96 A.D.2d 733, 465 N.Y.S.2d 84 
(4th Dept. 1983). 
Recommendation:  Affirm. 
